Inside Dominic Raab's Private Office

I cannot improve on

• Sam Freedman’s blog about the Dominic Raab report and what it tells us about Whitehall,

• Patrick Diamond and Dave Richards’ analysis of what Mr Raab’s resignation tell us about the current state of Minister-Civil Servant relations, and

• Alex Thomas’ Twitter thread in defence of impartiality.

But I was a Principal Private Secretary for a couple of fairly eventful years, supporting three Conservative Secretaries of State, so I can offer some thoughts on interactions between senior ministers and their civil servants.

First, almost all civil servants - even very experienced ones - are properly quite nervous or on edge when they meet senior ministers. The latter are powerful people who have been given their power through an ostensibly democratic process. Every aspect of our training and experience encourages us to want to provide them with first class support. We also want to be seen by our colleagues to be professional and effective, and to make a good impression in meetings. Mistakes will haunt us for years.

Some officials get to know some ministers quite well, and achieve good working relationships. They will be become more confident, especially in meetings, but always respectful. And the occasional very senior official can be patronising, but this is quite rare and seldom ends well.

Crises, however, tend to generate rushed activity and mistakes. Ministers under fire want to know “Why the hell did that happen?”. The answer is seldom immediately obvious but embarrassed officials will rush to suggest that “Maybe the problem was that ..”. The minister or Spad will brief the media accordingly … until it turns out there was a different problem whereupon ministerial ire will reach new heights.

It can also be difficult to work well for ministers who want to delve into the detail. The system expects Cabinet Ministers to focus on the big picture and to delegate any detailed casework etc. to junior ministers and to officials. Many Secretaries of State expect submissions, for instance to be no longer than around two pages. Senior officials, too, rely on their Grade 7s/Principals to know the detail and will draw on at expertise when required. They may not be able to answer ministers’ detailed questions.

Whatever the issue, officials vary in their ability to respond to ministerial questioning. Most senior officials can write clear, logical submissions etc. and most can summarise issues pretty well. (It is fairly common for a minister to turn to an official five minutes before a meeting, admit they haven’t read the brief and ask what they should say!) But many gentle souls quail if faced with a full-on inquisition. Lawyer advocates can succeed only if they can ‘think on their feet’ and respond firmly to aggressive questioning by an opponent or judge. Most solicitors don’t need that skill, nor do most senior civil servants. They therefore find it hard to respond effectively to an angry minister.

It’s even more difficult when the minister appears to have misunderstood something or made a mistake. Ministers expect deference and seldom appreciate those who ‘speak truth to power’ quite as much as the textbooks say they should.

The safety valve in these circumstances is this standard advice:

If a Minister makes a decision that you consider to be seriously wrong then you have the right – indeed it is your responsibility – to check (a) that the Minister has been presented in writing with all the relevant facts and arguments, and with a clear recommendation, in a form which he can easily assimilate, and (b) that they have read the advice and has understood all the important factors. If this has not happened then you should consult the Minister’s Private Secretary about the best way to correct matters.

Further written advice will often be enough, including any necessary apology for failing to prepare comprehensive advice the first time round. But if comprehensive advice has already been submitted, and the decision is important enough, then you should press for the opportunity to argue the case a second time, preferably in person.

If the Minister then still rejects your recommendation then you must accept the decision. It is not for you to question the political or strategic thinking that might have contributed to the decision in question unless, exceptionally, the Minister appears to be ignoring legal advice or defying Government policy, e.g. by failing to consult interested colleagues.

(For context and more detail, see Chapter 4 “No! Minister” here.)

Against this background, those who have read Adam Tolley’s report and other comment will recognise that Mr Raab must have been extremely difficult to work for. As Sam Freedman points out, “His behaviour had been an open secret for years. The high turnover in his private office was a matter of record, as was the [danger money] offered to officials to work with him. … people were dissuaded from making complaints, and senior civil servants tried to find ways round the misery he caused”.

What did Mr Raab get so wrong? According to Mr Tolley:

The DPM’s style is, in his own words, inquisitorial, direct, impatient and fastidious. … he tends to prepare extensively for meetings, will typically have read all of the key papers and identified questions in advance. He explained that he does not wish to receive a recitation of papers which he has already read. He will focus on the points of interest to him.

An important part of the DPM’s general approach as a Minister is, as he explained and I accept, to seek to ensure that responsibility for the performance of any task is allocated to a suitable, identified individual. He will then operate on the basis that the individual is accountable for the performance of the task in question.

He prefers to receive papers in a set format so that he can quickly assimilate the information in question. If work is not provided to his satisfaction, he will in general say so. If in the course of a meeting an attendee does not in the DPM’s view answer a question in a manner which he regards as direct and straightforward, the DPM will likely interrupt.

The DPM often operates on the basis that once he has made a policy decision, it should not be revisited subsequently by civil servants. He refers to this, when it occurs, as ‘relitigating his steers’.

We also know from Raphael Marshall, a whistleblower who subsequently left the civil service, that Mr Raab had needlessly delayed evacuations from Afghanistan because the then Foreign Secretary insisted on approving each case himself, and sent one submission back merely to be re-formatted as a table, which took several hours.

Mr Raab’s style would almost inevitably lead to disaster. Anxious - terrified, even - officials will not perform at their best and may even make serious mistakes. Senior staff will flounder when asked very specific questions. Some of them will be less able than others to provide instant oral responses to very pointed questioning, even if the questions are reasonable.

It is particularly concerning that Mr Raab was unwilling to revisit his decisions. This was anyway bad practice, but would also raise the tension levels in any discussion.

However … I am not alone in wondering where the Permanent Secretaries were in all this. I can understand their unwillingness to use the ‘bully’ word. And I don’t suppose that Mr Raab would have listened to advice about how to get the best out of his officials.

Gaby Hinscliiff:- “What's fascinating re Raab is the report literally offers him a lifeline ('he was abrasive but didn't realise it upset people & now he does, he's toned it down!') that he's actively thrown back at them. Say contritely 'I've listened & learned' & you're halfway to a comeback but … coming out punching? Weird case of the resignation being arguably more damaging than the findings.”

Nevertheless, the underlying problem is that his several Permanent Secretaries knew about Mr Raab’s behaviour but nothing was done about it. This saga therefore seems destined to be another example to be added to the list demonstrating of how the civil service is a Rolls Royce no longer; a conclusion with which Mr Raab and I would unfortunately agree.

Martin Stanley - Editor - Understanding the Civil Service